

HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY: A GENEALOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: *What could we possibly learn from a 70 year correspondence from the years of the Second World War, when the course of subsequent history has already been known? The sociologist is interested in seeing how an event unfolds, how it generates other actions, how the actors are driven by, what their strategies are and how they interact. The aim of the present essay is to identify those sociological concepts, that could lead us to explanations of the geopolitical, regarding the way Germany built up its hegemony, by starting from a genealogical perspective, that is, by identifying the logics of a situation and by understanding the reasoning behind individual decision while taking into consideration the analysis of the discourse. We take into account how enforcing a drastic peace treaty on Germany has lead to high surveillance costs that could not be sustained by the victors because of their path dependence, which ultimately led to the fact of the 'good' being sacrificed for the sake of the 'comfortable'. We understand how military successes represent the test of truth for an ideology and provide the Nazi leaders with their legitimacy, inciting a group phantasm. We discern, in the relations between Germany, Soviet Union and the French-English duo, all the elements of a triad and, implicitly, all elements of power that are generated by a game based on imposing and accepting uncertainties. All of the above bare evidence to the fact that sociological notions and concepts can produce revelations when taken into new domains, such as geopolitics and war.*

Key words: *interdependence, surveillance costs, path dependence, power, uncertainty.*

1. Introduction

I Want To Be Revised As Well—Periodicals from 1937-1940 is an anthology whose author is Zoltán Rostás attempting to recover the correspondence of Mihai Pop, dating from the time he spent in Prague, which had been previously published in *Lumea*

românească [10]. What nowadays appears in our eyes as *history*, as being an inherent, logical development of events, an expression of continuity, is in fact a simplification, because in reality we encounter elements of discontinuity, of various possibilities for the events to have unfolded otherwise, depending on a decision, which could have led to an

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entirely different field of possibilities. Hence we have to read his writings from the perspective of the *novelty* of and *closeness* to the events which were taking place. We also have to observe the adherence to a certain kind of lifestyle and the refusal of another, which was taking shape during the period.

Question: how much sociology resides in such a discourse? Beyond identifying the sociological character of Mihai Pop's perspective, our enquiry focuses on creating out of this correspondence a *reference book for practical sociological works*, encompassing exercises, interpretations and sociological explanations which would have to be invented [2, p.14-15].

One of the first problems raised by Mihai Pop is: which is the role of the intellectual? In the undeniable legacy of the Enlightenment and of Modernity, the intellectual is that person who has the capacity of analyzing the problems posed by the present they are living in.

What does thinking teach him? It teaches him that he is a part of a system of power of which he is both an object and an instrument and that his *truth* is a weapon to be used on the battlefield of ongoing conflicts [4, p.148]. There are no theoreticians or practicians, there are only fighters. It is no less true that if the author is positioned on the good side of history the relations between power, truth and knowledge will partly be concealed.

Mihai Pop is writing under the pseudonym of Petre Buga, a decision which has two complementary explanations. First, the author is trying to protect himself from his writing, which is a *trace*. Then, freed of his actual name, he stops considering himself as an author, in the foucauldian meaning of the word (the author's name has a certain task when related to discourse; *"it enables classification; such a name allows a*

certain number of texts to be regrouped, to be marked off, while excluding some and opposing others" [5, p.43]), as if hinting that any man with common sense would have written in the same way. Consequently, his articles are not and do not claim to be scientific studies because their author understands that he is on a battlefield. The writing is simple, clear, emotional, engaged, it defines the enemy and the dangers involved. The writing is tributary to the signified and does not enter the expressive logic of the signifier with its play of signs and prefabricates striving to impress.

What is the reason for Mihai Pop to undertake such an endeavor? Our hypothesis is that Mihai Pop is trying to form a circle of friends, in other words, he is recruiting soldiers for the war to come. In Sloterdijk's opinion *"writing not only constitutes a considerably long bridge between proven friends who are far away from each other, but it also initiates an influence amongst those not yet proven as friends, it makes a move of wooing new friends from afar, a move of action in distantis, in the language of the antique-European magic, with the aim of exposing that potential friend and determining him to become part of his circle of friends"* [11, p.9].

This is the case for a group of people who are spiritually bonded by means of a newspaper and the articles published in it. It lies in the power of the journalist to produce these kind of relationships between people who don't know each other. *"Only a newspaper can kindle at the same time, the same idea in so many spirits"*, says Tocqueville [13, p.125].

Mihai Pop is aware of the power of his articles and tries to build up a force (Deleuze would say a *group phantasm*), which could withstand a military power which is counting its victories, a force which should become a *desiring-machine*, the expression of such values as democracy, tolerance, or human rights.

2. A few perspectives of analysis

A first note to be made is regarding the way in which Mihai Pop perceives the international political life, as being a structure made up of a number of interacting levels. The first level is defined by the relations between the actors, who are the states considered as political entities and who play a geopolitical game characterized by relations of cooperation, competition and conflict. On the second level this structure is influenced by the internal politics of each state, its foreign policy being configured by these internal forces. This is where discussions about each country's political system, social problems, political ethos etc. become part of the larger structure. Finally, this structure is influenced by what we shall call the third level - interdependencies generated by the movement of capital and the human resources of the actors involved. The three levels aren't autonomous; the political actors themselves (the states) will transgress the limits of these levels in order to obtain the greatest power possible in the structure of geopolitical relations.

First, Mihai Pop portrays the relation between states from the perspective of *interdependence*. Hence the interest manifested towards all events that take place in the European space, an interest which tries to identify the consequences of particular events on the existing relational system. The chancellor Dolfuss is Mussolini's friend and on his death bed, after the Nazi's assassination attempt, he entrusts his family to Mussolini. When Hitler and Mussolini hug, they give Mihai Pop the impression that they are immobilizing their arms, "*because otherwise they would have to draw their swords*". Political figures get along or they don't, but everything is actually a cover for cold calculus. For a historian, the

correspondence draws attention to facts which may now seem minor, but which in their respective context had a particular significance.

What now appears to be a clear course of events, conceals, in fact, a sort of Brownian movement. Which raises the question: how did Germany manage to become the main actor in the European space?

Our hypothesis, while reading the correspondence of Mihai Pop, is that at the moment of 1937 the victorious countries of the First World War no longer could, nor wished, to pay the costs generated by the mechanism that was holding the peace together, which had worked for two decades. It would have been difficult to convince the public opinion that arming would have to continue and pressure on Germany would have to recommence. We face blockages and limitations in terms of both social psychology and economy. The great victorious nations were psychologically and economically exhausted. There was a clear discrepancy between the interior, every-day life of these countries and what was going on an international level. A postwar era demands a different political and public agenda. This determines these countries' governments to stop sanctioning Germany's breaking the rules which they themselves had established and imposed up until then.

The eternal problem of surveillance efficiency is now illustrated on a continental level. When we face an exaggerated domination, its costs become, over time, difficult to bear, and the dominating entity either gives up on its position, or identifies alternative resources in order to sustain the surveillance costs. Based on reasons we will analyze later, the great European powers, victorious in the First World War, chose to lower the surveillance costs. In other words, the rise

of Germany was due to the incapacity of the League of Nations to respond, and this was a consequence of the fact, that this geopolitical reality was built on a player who didn't have the necessary resources to sustain it. England was faced with a *path dependence* ("it has to save its colonies") and with its own delays ("it wasn't yet armed") - facts which caused it to stop being the most powerful country in the world.

It is possible that precisely because of the colonial issues and their will to solve them, that England and France chose a radical solution in order for Germany not to create any further problems and implemented an inconsiderate mechanism of imposing the postwar order. This mechanism created a phenomenon, which sociologists call *unforeseen consequences*, which also lead to an increase in the *surveillance costs* and which we suppose was not taken into account by the victors, as we also suppose that the mechanism was not drafted to survive unforeseen situations, such as the breaching of the peace treaty by the Germans. We can assert that the surveillance costs turned out to be big, because the peace treaty had generated oppositions derived from the victor's violation of a fundamental war principle, the principle of chivalry which consists in saving the honor of the vanquished.

In his correspondence Mihai Pop describes Nazism as being the result of two phenomena, one cultural (regarding the ethno-axiological structure of the Germans) and the other historical, relating to liberalism. The first phenomenon is emphasized but both are included in the expression "*the German is the devil's man*". Things are not that simple and we support our doubts by quoting a text written by Weber in 1919: "*a nation can forgive the harming of its interests, but it cannot forgive the aggression of its honor,*

especially when it is achieved with such insidious arrogance" [14, p.45]. This lack of etiquette "*leads, in fact, to a humiliation of both parties*". Moreover, Weber demands that German politicians recognize war as emerging from the "*structure of society*" and that they propose the victorious nations' politicians to "*identify the repercussions of this situation on the objective interests which were at stake and, especially, regarding the responsibility for the future, a responsibility which concerns the victors first and foremost*" [14, p.45]. In other words, Weber asserts that a dignified attitude of the German politicians could determine the victors to adopt an attitude, which encompasses a concern for the future in the peace negotiations, placing everything beyond '*feelings*', that is, in an '*objective*' frame. Weber's text concludes that the atmosphere in Germany was one of trying to identify the persons responsible for the national disaster, an atmosphere of strong emotive behavior which encouraged a disregarding attitude of the victors, along with a response in the same parameters of the '*emotional*'. This would have disastrous implications in time, as we now know.

The rupture between the discourse and the actions of the victors was going to turn against them like a boomerang. The victors expected the chivalrous spirit to be maintained in the sphere of international relations, not taking into account that the terms of the peace treaty imposed on Germany weren't in the least chivalrous. All of a sudden, the victors seem to be suffering from a case of amnesia and refuse to believe that politics is *war fought with other means*. And so it happens that the order established by the peace treaties following the First World War abruptly turns into disorder, into an unpredictable and uncontrollable world. Theory states that one of the sources of power consists in

its capacity to generate uncertainty! In fact, this will be the card played by the Germans, that of the initiative that creates uncertainties!

Beyond aspects regarding the managing of their own empire, Britain's gesture to give up on political initiative has numerous explanations. It is obvious, that in the system of priorities the *imperial* problems are more important than the *European* ones. This phenomenon coincided with the collapse of the old British conception where the English Channel was a guarantee of security against any potential continental enemy. The British took notice of the technology-imposed changes which required a new way of tackling the issue of security. Feeling they were vulnerable, they tried to gain time and mobilize, abandoning part of their preoccupations with the continental affairs. Mihai Pop asserts that "*things aren't that simple. The security of the west can't be dissociated from that of the east*". Through this concession the British had offered the Germans the necessary resources to become stronger and increase pressure on their enemies.

Tocqueville maintains that the people who live in democratic societies need freedom in order to "*more easily acquire the material pleasures they continuously crave for*" [13, p.153]. The taste for pleasure "*can deliver them to the first master on sight*". Tocqueville learns that "*it is not necessary to wring such citizens out of their rights; they themselves will let them slip through their fingers*", their public duties being seen as "*tedious pursuits*", because while following their own interest, people "*slight the main interest, which is to remain their own masters*" [13, p.154]. In other words, the desire for comfort has led to the sacrifice of the good, which in this case means dropping out of defending the political freedom on the continent, endangered by

the German war-machine. Freedom and human rights were no longer considered to be universal, generally accepted and having to be defended anymore, they were territorialized. The disconnection from signal-events like the Spanish civil war represented the withdrawal from the fight for democracy, which was somewhat understandable, considering what we have observed earlier: the lack of a military capacity to respond. Unfortunately, this contributed to the rising conception according to which democracy, human rights or tolerance do not represent universal values, a conception which indirectly legitimates Fascism and Nazism.

There are other aspects as well, they belong to what we were calling *the third level* of reality. Mihai Pop tackles the question of the role capital takes up in this war-announcing configuration: "*England has to save its colonies, but also the money placed on the Berlin market. Therefore it has an interest in maintaining things in their momentary state, along with an interest in Germany's economic prosperity. It has to preserve itself as a state, but it also has to ensure the maximum of profit for some of its leaders.*" [10, p.37]. We could assert that British politicians' reticence is due to the system of economic dependencies which lets the English financial elite become captive in relation to Germany. Moreover, the English upper middle class doesn't desire peace for metaphysical reasons, "*but because it is aware that a war, even a victorious one, would be its extinction. It doesn't actually want peace either, it is just trying to avoid war at any cost*" [10, p.377]. In other words, when analyzing the Anglo-German relations, we will find that the English middle class only believes in non-zero-sum games and does not realize that the political scene had turned into a zero-sum game, considering that in Germany the economic sector was

subordinated to the political one, to be exact, to the group that was controlling the state (“*party governmentality*”, as Foucault calls it), at the advantage of the latter. By comparison, in Britain, the political dimension is subordinated to the economic mechanism, more precisely to the group that is in charge of business. What the English considered to be a market-deduced ‘*economic truth*’ the Germans saw as an ‘*economic truth*’ which was part of a ‘*political truth*’, that of a government founded on arming and preparation for war.

England would at any time have preferred a partnership with Germany to one with Soviet Union. The evaluations taken into consideration by Mihai Pop were the following: a German-Soviet war won by the Russians would represent a danger for England because of Germany’s expected conversion to communism. Otherwise, if the winners were the Germans, they would be so drained by this war, they would need the help of England. The British wished Germany would attack Soviet Union and be strong enough to defeat it. Bolshevism wasn’t a direct threat for the British, claims Mihai Pop, it was only looming - which explains the encouraging attitude towards Germany. England is trying to place itself in a position of “*tertius gaudens*”.

What is the significance of the possible German domination? Mihai Pop identifies what would be an unprecedented judicial-political process in the sphere of international relations, specifically Germany’s introduction of a “*sovereignty – disciplinary mechanism*” system in the structure of international relations. This would lead to a normalizing order in all of the European space: once all European countries are of German sovereignty, the citizens of these states would be included in the German “*disciplinary*” machine. Through the lens of Mihai Pop we can see

Germany’s attempts to make out of every country a subject of its action on sovereignty and for the first time, in reporting on the crisis of the Sudeten Germans, there are signals being raised regarding the prototype of the disciplinary mechanism which is the *concentration camp*.

From the correspondence of Mihai Pop we understand that Germany’s power has increased with every military and political success. In comparison with the First World War, in which Germany had attacked strong enemies, German strategy has changed toward attacking weak countries. This fact had a number of consequences. First of all, the German actions had more chances to succeed. For the small states to become targets of the German power, it was necessary for the League of Nations to collapse. Hence the preoccupations of these states to engage in a variety of military and political alliances, which would strengthen them in relation to the German military colossus.

Secondly, the military success provided the criteria of validation for the German worldview, after the rule according to which “*practice is the criteria for truth*” - a fundamental relation is established between force and truth. First and foremost we identify a desire (“*the masses were not cheated into it, they desired fascism at one point*” affirms Deleuze [3, p.40], taking over an idea of Reich) and this desire tries to materialize through military success, which generated beliefs, and these beliefs consequently validate the values of leadership and, implicitly, the leaders. The situation is described by Weber as being one in which “*ethics can play a very sinister role from a moral point of view*”, and the cited example is from the military sphere, “*when after victory in a battle, the victor claims, with a snide air of superiority: I have won, therefore, without doubt, justice is on my side.*” [14, p.44].

We observe how the way the peace following the First World War, which Weber criticizes, is defined, is paradoxically framed in a feudal definition of law, which is essentially Germanic. Victory or failure represent tests of Truth and Justice and this pattern will be used by the Germans after 1933. Therefore, war can produce the truth the political class needs, military successes form the values of the German society and generate self-fulfilling prophecies, which later sustain the governance. That war brings death and sacrifice is irrelevant as long as it is a creator of truth. These successes contribute to the completion of the German state, in the sense suggested by Foucault when he affirms that *“the state is at the same time something that exists and something that doesn't exist enough”* [6, p.14], and they enact a return to a premodern moment, when the state rationality subordinates law. Simultaneously with this operation of the “fulfillment” of the state through the state rationality, the military victories bind individuals in what Deleuze calls *“a severe act of fabulation”*, namely *“the movement of constructing a people”* [2, p.113]. The war produces political signs for national identification and for legitimizing the leader - the one to have voiced the *truth* and developed the technology through which it can be demonstrated, namely the military technology.

We cannot avoid connecting this aspect with the last phrase we find in the aforementioned correspondence, namely that the fate of the west will be decided by *“the power of weapons and economic endurance”*. We dare suggest replacing the two notions with concepts such as *efficiency* and *power*. In one of his analyses, Mihai Pop affirms that, since *“a war of endurance could be fatal”* for Germany, it will want to quickly initiate the attack on the Dutch-Belgian border. In the same economical spirit, Mihai Pop sees

through the nature of the relations existing in the triad between the French-English alliance, Germany and Soviet Union. Each actor of the triad tries to prevent the forming of an alliance of the other two, since none of them has the necessary resources for a war on two fronts. Adversely, each state wants to form an alliance with one of the other two actors. Initially we witness the Anglo-German agreement (*“not out of immediate fear of bolshevism, but in order to destroy it”*). For the same reason Germany will make an alliance with Soviet Union and for the same reason England will not attack the U.S.S.R., (*“on the contrary, it would have all the reasons to win over the favor of Soviet Union”*) [p.412]. On the other hand: *“the latent desire of Soviet Union leaders to give the age of capitalism and liberalism a mortal blow via the destruction of the biggest political power representing it, and not scattered ‘world revolutions’”* [10, p.384] led to their alliance with Nazi Germany. The initiative always belonged to Germany and it will choose and impose the way of defining the majority in the triad, its interests oscillating between an alliance with the Occident and an alliance with the Soviets. In fact, each German conquest is based on variously disguised calculated blows given to democracy, while also speculating on the tension between capitalism and bolshevism existing in relations between England and France, on one hand, Soviet Union on the other. This game is also favored by the phrase ‘national-socialism’, which permits both the orientation against the east Slavs and against the western Imperialism. On the backdrop of this game *young wolfs* trying to grab a piece of the kill emerge - Mihai Pop names Italy, Hungary and Poland.

Alliances are formed depending on military objectives. Mihai Pop identifies the source of Germany’s military victories, namely the superior efficacy of the army.

Since this efficacy could only be illustrated through the attack on its western neighbors, the German propaganda deceptively focuses on the battle against Bolshevism, in order to set the public opinion amiss, consequently attacking Belgium and the Netherlands, a fact which was registered by Mihai Pop as a shifting of the war towards the west. Opening two fronts will also foreshadow the defeat of Germany, because it implies the transition to a war of endurance doubled by a transition from a logic of *efficiency* to one of *power*, of available resources.

Nazism was the ideology that created a people after the likeness of the Third Reich, imagining the development of “*a severe act of fabulation*” driven by a dream of conquest. Since the military victories confirmed the truth of the fabulation, they defined the idea of the German people at that time. Hence it is befitting to turn to another paradigm regarding historic interpretation which should have at its core the notion of discontinuity. In the absence of this notion it is very difficult to associate Germany’s cultural inheritance to the horrors of the Third Reich. There is a double movement of change and reversal. The notion of *people* belongs to the Middle Ages and we see it reinvented now, replacing the modern notion of *population* with its correlative, the *human being* [7, p.78]. In order to make the change - reversal happen, the correlative of the notion *people* is the *new human being*. The notions of *population* and *human being* relate to the reality of the present, whilst the German notion of *people* relates to the past, and the notion of *new human being* to the future. It’s like saying that Nazism dissolves the present in both future and past. The past means community, blood and the idea of conflict as the Middle Ages have premonished it - in the words of Foucault: “*the enemies who are in front of*

us will continue to threaten us and we will not be able to reach the end of the war through a sort of reconciliation or an agreement, unless we are the victors” [8, p.53]. The future depends on the relations with the neighboring communities. The past teaches that you have to be led by a *Führer*, the future shows that you will lead all of those who don’t belong to the same blood. Taking over a scheme of Baudrillard, we will affirm that the *German desire* moves on two axes: hostage of the own community – the domain of security (1) and terrorist of other peoples – the domain of freedom (2).

Lastly, the fact that Germany is going for safe victims, states without *power*, is also favored by the British calculations which consider the costs of saving these unimportant victims to be too great in relation to the main interests of the country - which determined the chances of Germany’s success to increase: “*Germany wants to have a free hand on Eastern Europe in exchange for the security it offers the West. And it seems English financial circles have too much capital on Berlin markets and would be ready to exert discreet pressures on the British government as to trade off the nonobliteration of the colonies’ issue and an Oriental agreement against this rather uninteresting Eastern Europe*” [10, p.34-35]. Via arming and military success, Germany will impose the sacrificing of world peace as a universal commodity, transforming peace into a regional commodity and, finally, into a national one. Mihai Pop condemns England’s attitude, for abandoning the role of *master* of the modern world and accepting German domination.

The legitimacy acquired by the government through the military success was a check in white for the entire government plan. Mihai Pop is daunted by the prospect of German victory, of the world peace being a German one and every

German victory seems to him to be leading to terrible evil. Mihai Pop fervently hopes for a defeat of the Germans, which would make the Germans and not only have them abandoned their “*severe act of fabulation*”. Mihai Pop accordingly emphasizes the political position of Czechoslovakia and the way in which the political class of this country relates to Germany. Czechoslovakia is willing to oppose Germany and Mihai Pop considers that “*hence, standing next to Czechoslovakia is not just an obligation, which ensues from the structure of the Little Entente, but also a necessity for the whole system on which the peace of contemporary Europe stands*” [10, p.256].

The vulnerability of Czechoslovakia lies in Germany’s capacity to use Czechoslovakia’s national minorities as an advantage in its own politics of expansion. Mihai Pop’s correspondence teaches us that the Germans of the Sudetenland aren’t the only ones putting pressure on the Czech government, but also the Hungarians and the Polish, “*not so much in order to obtain them, as for sustaining the action of mister Henlein [the leader of the Sudetenland Germans]*”.

The choice made by these minorities didn’t in any way target the problem of democracy and of the human rights. The ethnic minorities of Czechoslovakia played their role as a *Trojan horse*, which determined the country to fall without a fight when it faced Germany’s pressure.

There is a whole set of analyses carried through by Mihai Pop regarding the role of Italy in the power equation of interwar Europe. These accounts portray an active Italy, important and coveted by the great European powers. In other words, considering the conflictive relation between England and France on one the hand and Germany on the other, Italy acquires importance because it affords to play on two ends - it faces an open choice.

This goes to show that during the decades separating the two world wars the game was played according to the rule of the *minimal powers*, namely who is allying with whom. Once the system of alliances had stabilized and the implications of the political game had surfaced, the relations of force being based on the resources the belligerent camps disposed of, the force of Italy was reduced to the real level of its resources, which were indicating an inferior force when compared to its position within the alliance system. The volume’s last analysis is dated on the 10th of March 1940 and it foreshadows Italy’s abandoning its status as a nonbelligerent country and it is in the very least probable that “*it should adhere to the alliance of the two*”, the French-English alliance being meant. The prediction is partially confirmed, since Mihai Pop deemed it unlikely of Italy to join the unfolding conflict.

In the power equation of the interbellum, elements of vulnerability are a measure of the power of a state. Mihai Pop carefully analyzes the case of Poland, in whose anatomy he identifies a few economic and ethnic threats caused by its spatial context. First, almost a fifth of the population consists of a Russian minority which has a compact position at the Soviet border covering a full third of the country’s surface. Beyond their borders there are the Ukrainian and Byelorussian populations, and “*both of these peoples are but in the romantic phase of the awakening of the national conscience and of the formation of their own political structures.*” Besides, “*the Ukrainians are conducting a determined irredentist movement, sustained by a prolificacy superior to that of their Polish neighbors, a strong national solidarity and by a systematic action of economical organization and conquest*” [10, p. 40]. Furthermore, Poland was confronted with serious social problems,

which led to a rural insurgence. The leading group, not wanting to give up on its advantages, and using the pretext of maintaining the order – that of the old domination system - pushes the social problem into the sphere of the existing interethnic relations (in Galicia, against the Ukrainian population, in Bialystok, against the Byelorussian peasants and against the Jews) in its attempt to create national and social solidarity by pointing towards an internal threat. The theory of conflict states that a dyadic conflict configuration is much more dangerous for the stability of a social system than multiple, smaller conflicts. But in the aforementioned case the theory seems to be invalidated because through the merging of social problems with ethnic issues, a new weakness is added to the existing social one - in a context in which 37% of the country's population is a minority and at a moment when the geopolitical context is largely unfavorable. Mihai Pop makes it very clear: Poland will either follow the path of democracy, or it will use the methods of Tsarist Russia. The political context is edging towards a zero-sum game: you are either on the side of Germany, or of Soviet Union. This situation will not restrain the country's leaders from preying on a neighboring country they had collaborated with, Czechoslovakia, and dreaming about hegemony in the Balkans.

The absence of morality in international politics is mirroring the lax moral standards of the societies. Mihai Pop affirms that a big part of our middle class has a fixation with "*fascism's power to organize and civilize*". The slaughter whose victims were the Abyssinians was pardoned by the Romanian middle class on the reason of it being done by "*our Latin sister*"; the massacre of the civil population by general Franco is based on "*the love for the church, the people and for the belief of our forefathers*"; the

Japanese "*will by conquering China bring order to the anarchy reigning there and will civilize the barbaric Chinese*" [10, p.79]. What do we observe? The choice for fascist ideas is based on a natural right, in the sense described by Walter Benjamin [1, p.8]: if the goal is just, the means used to get to it are irrelevant. This idea opposes the positive right, where choosing the means takes place in function of whether they are legal or not. Romantic vindicative arguments don't allow any space discussion or questioning from the perspective of human rights.

In this context, notions like democracy, human rights, tolerance aren't showing up. How was it possible for the Romanian bourgeoisie to be 'seduced' by the fascist argument? We can formulate an answer if we take into account an assessment of Heidegger, namely that "*susceptible of coming into being is only what was already there*" [9, p. 297]. In other words, the fact in itself is not independent of an essence of the Romanian bourgeoisie, of the way it was born. Hence our hypothesis, that the modernization of the Romanian society contains a certain socio-political peculiarity: a middle class which never had to fight for political rights and never considered it necessary to support democracy as a political system when it asserted its position as a dominant class [10, p.136]. Modernization is seen from the point of view of economics (and not politics) - from the perspective of the market, based on the production of goods and services which could be bought and sold, on the increased domestic consumption. The perspective of the political conquest and the need of turning the Romanian citizen into a political subject are not considered and this is, in Mihai Pop's opinion, a sign of our country's vulnerability. Besides, it was precisely the lack of bureaucratic discipline that the Romanian firms

confronted, a fact which had to generate some expectations in this direction.

Another decisive absence from Romanian political discourse is the absence of the democracy-generating concept of *human rights*. The mass-media's glorification of the transition from a parliamentary system to a Carlist dictatorship shouldn't surprise us. The absence of human rights from the political conscience leaves the way open for the exacerbated national discourse of the right, and the correspondence of Mihai Pop wouldn't have been able to bring about any significant change since it was minority.

3. Conclusions

Let's return to the question we asked at the beginning of the essay: why does Mihai Pop feel the need to write articles and send them back home? Our assumption is based on a general deleuzian idea, which is confirmed by the fact that Mihai Pop isn't writing with his *self*, with his memory and his diseases, the absence of these references being, for that matter, striking. In fact, *"one writes in the name of a people which has not appeared yet and which has not had a language yet. Creation is not communication, it is resistance."* The correspondence can also be read as the trace of a dream, the refusal to believe in the *truth* of the present. We cannot assess the impact that Mihai Pop's articles have had. But we can ask ourselves this question: can journalism compensate for the absence of a consideration of human rights and the democratic practice which a society derives from this concept?

For historians, Mihai Pop's articles could point to the historical relevance of individual events. We could use our imagination and construct a weberian model on historic causality and try to understand the role of one event or another. We can either agree or disagree

with Mihai Pop when he asserts that what we encounter between 1937 and 1940 is neither an opposition between Nazism and communism, nor one between capitalism and communism but an irreconcilable conflict between Nazism and human rights. We are at a moment when "God is dead" and human rights, if they had been born, hadn't yet become principles of state politics in international relations. It is Sloterdijk who maintains that *"what truly determines the character of an age pertains to its political statements because they are the ones to reconfigure the period's general conception of things. To declare God dead in a culture conditioned by monotheism implies a shattering of all existing references and heralds a new world. With 'God', the whole idea of the affiliation of all humans to the unity of the created species is erased."* [11, p.41]. If we see capitalism as the merging of two magical forces: the market bonded with liberalism and imperialism, on the one hand, and a political system based on human rights on the other, then the historian would be able to say that the Nazism that evolved under these conditions was, at the moment when Mihai Pop was writing his correspondence, an attempt to obliterate both the notion of *human rights*, and that of *truth* (as defined by the market) and the emergence of a new political phenomenon, the *impossible*, at the time when politics was seized by the *big kids* (as they are envisioned by Bismarck - *"For [him] it is those adults that never encountered situations which would make learn the difference between politically possible and politically impossible, that have remained children"* [11, p.11]). An entire tradition, expressed by Weber and anticipated by him, which associated politics with the ethics of responsibility and with a clear definition of the ethics of convictions, is being discarded.

There is a point where history meets sociology. History seems to be *dead*. Sociology studies events. Mihai Pop's effort concerns events, that is, it speaks of what is *becoming*, the author being a witness to the resurgence of the *new*. Deleuze affirms: "*history extracts from events the effects of its own practice on the state of things, but the events in their becoming elude history. History is no experimentation - it is the ensemble of almost negative conditions which enable the experimentation of something that evades history. Without history, experimentation would remain undetermined, unconditioned, but experimentation is not historical*" [2. p.148]. By drawing on these deleuzian ideas we try not to consider the 'correspondence' a history book, because history doesn't record the becoming - history is a block, a limit, it places us in something solid, in something that has remained after decantation, and events form into actions, incidents, of somewhat Brownian nature, which allow for the creation of historical facts. If the historian tends to view history as a collection of events, the sociologist is interested in observing how the event unfolds, how actors interact, what motivation their moves are determined by and what logic their senses follow. We are fundamentally talking about the effort of placing yourself, as Foucault suggests, in a *genealogical* perspective in order to identify the logics of a situation and to understand individual decisions from within their determined context.

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